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Abstract 
In many countries, Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) establishes different regulations 
for certain groups of workers who face more disadvantages in the labor market (young 
workers, women, unskilled workers, etc.) with the aim of improving their employability. 
Well-known examples are the introduction of atypical employment contracts (e.g., temporary 
and determined-duration contracts) which ease firing restrictions for some, but not all, 
workers. 
This paper discusses the effects of EPL varying among workers of different skills on 
the level and composition of unemployment, job flows, productivity and welfare. By using an 
extension of Mortensen-Pissarides’ (1994) search model where heterogeneous workers 
compete for the same jobs, we are able to identify several key channels through which 
changing firing costs for some groups of workers affects hiring and firing of all workers and, 
hence, may have a different impact on aggregate labor market variables than reducing firing 
costs across the board. Some analytical and simulation results also show that these effects of 
differentiated firing costs by workers’ skills may be different depending upon the initial state of 
the labor market. 
JEL codes: J63, J64. 
Keywords: Firing costs, matching, unemployment. 
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1 Introduction 
In many European countries labor market reforms are often framed as employment promotion 
policies aimed at favoring particularly disadvantaged groups in the labor market. A well-known 
example is the use of employment subsidies targeted at specific population groups like, 
e.g., young, low-skilled or long-term unemployed workers. Another, perhaps less well-known, 
example has been provided by a number of recent reforms in Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL, hereafter) whereby the availability of flexible contracts for hiring (part-time, 
fixed-term, seasonal, etc.) has been restricted to workers belonging to specific categories 
(related to occupations, skills, age or educational attainments) which typically exclude 
prime-age workers.1 Our paper focuses on the effects of the latter reforms which we claim are 
pervasive across the EPL regulations in many countries. 
While there may be good political economy reasons for reforming the labor market 
through two-tier schemes [see Saint-Paul (1996 and 2000)], the economic consequences of 
allowing for targeted EPL regulations are less well understood. To the best of our knowledge, 
most papers analyzing the effects of firing costs have generally overlooked the fact that 
severance payments differ for workers with different skills. This paper aims at filling this gap in 
the literature by providing a useful analytical framework where to examine the effects of 
differentiated employment policies in frictional labor markets with heterogeneous workers. We 
analyze their effects on a number of relevant dimensions of the labor market, such as 
equilibrium unemployment (and its distribution among workers of different types), job 
turnover, productivity and welfare. 
Our approach builds upon a growing literature on equilibrium unemployment in 
labor markets with workers and jobs heterogeneity starting with the seminal paper by 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).2 More specifically, our contribution complements the 
available studies on the effects of firing costs [e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), and 
Ljungqvist (2002)] and studies of partial reforms focusing on the conversion of fixed-term 
employment contracts into permanent ones [e.g., Blanchard and Landier (2002), and Cahuc 
and Postel-Vinay (2002)].3  
While the literature on dual labor markets has highlighted the consequences of 
having the option to convert one type of labor contract into another one, as regards to 
employment and job turnover,4 it ignores another important feature of dual labor markets, 
namely the fact that employment policies are often targeted to specific group of workers and 
that regulations pertaining to one specific segment of the labor market may affect other 
segments as well.5 For example, an important channel for these spillover effects stems from 
changes in the overall labor market tightness, which determines both the exit rate out of 
                                                                          
1. See Booth, Dolado and Frank (2002). 
2. In contrast to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) where two-sided heterogeneity is considered, we only allow for 
workers’ heterogeneity. However, whereas in their model the labour market is completely segmented, our contribution 
here is to relax that result by allowing workers with different characteristic to compete for the same jobs. 
3. For instance, both studies find that, after a reduction of firing costs in entry-level jobs, firms find attractive to hire more 
workers. However, they also become more reluctant to convert them into regular permanent employment contracts as, 
with low firing costs, taking the chance of matching with another worker may become an attractive option. This leads to 
a high workers’ turnover and, if the gap in severance pay is sufficiently large, to a rise in unemployment. 
4. Belot, Boone and van Ours (2002) analyze the trade-off between productivity and flexibility that may also influence the 
firm’s decision to convert a temporary job into a permanent one when job stability is productivity-enhancing. 
5. Some theoretical analyses of fixed-term contracts [e.g., Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), and Nunziata and 
Staffolani (2001)] assume that there are some restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts and impose a maximum 
value for the proportion of fixed-term employees that firms can hire. Note, however, that this restriction does not capture 
the targeted nature of “employment promotion” contracts. 
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unemployment for all workers and the profits of firms from opening vacancies. Furthermore, in 
as far as these changes in labor market tightness affect workers’ outside option values we 
may also expect changes in firms’ hiring and firing decisions. An exhaustive analysis of dual 
EPL therefore requires a model with endogenous job creation and job destruction, possibly in 
line with the one we propose here. 
One of the main motivations for this paper comes from some previous work by us 
on the functioning of labor markets with heterogeneous jobs and workers [see Dolado, 
Jansen and Jimeno (2003)] where it was shown that differentiated firing costs might 
reduce equilibrium unemployment in labor markets with pervasive mismatch and on-the-job 
search. Our earlier analytical framework relied upon a matching model with two-sided 
heterogeneity (skilled and unskilled jobs and low-educated and high-educated workers), 
where high-educated workers can be mismatched (i.e., can occupy unskilled jobs) and, if so, 
on-the-job search is exerted. Mismatch of overeducated workers in low-skilled jobs implies a 
negative externality on firms opening unskilled vacancies when both types of workers are 
equally productive at this type of jobs since, having a higher quit rate, on-the-job seekers 
make those jobs more unstable and therefore firms are less prone to open them.6 Thus, to 
the extent that larger firing costs for workers in skilled jobs reduces job turnover in these jobs, 
there might be situations where this type of targeted EPL policy reduces mismatch and the 
unemployment rates of both types of workers in the presence of skilled-biased technological 
change.7 
In this paper, however, we will abstract from on-the-job search and restrict the 
analysis to a single type of job which can be filled with either low-productivity workers or 
high-productivity workers, which may be entitled to different firing costs. This analytical 
shortcut will allow us to focus on the interactions between both types of workers in the 
same labor market so as to learn about the effects of dual EPL. In particular, building upon 
Mortensen and Pissarides’ (1994) model, we provide a simple framework where to quantify 
the efficiency gains and the impact on workers’ welfare of the following alternative 
policies regarding firing costs: i) a targeted reduction for the low-skilled workers, ii) a targeted 
reduction for the high-skilled workers, and iii) a comprehensive reduction for all workers. 
Another important simplifying assumption is that the firing costs are assumed to be pure 
waste as, for example, those stemming from judicial red-tape costs, etc. in the process of 
dismissals [see Burda (1992)]. In a more general model in which severance payments could 
play some insurance or productivity-enhancing role, the losses originating from their reduction 
ought to be weighed against the gains obtained under our assumption. Yet, the effects 
stressed here are likely to remain the same. 
After performing numerical simulations of the model, our main findings are 
that i) targeted reductions of firing costs may have different aggregate effects than 
commensurate reductions across the board and that ii) the effects on unemployment 
rates and welfare of the above-mentioned targeted reductions of firing costs may 
qualitatively depend on the initial state of the labor market, the shape of the matching 
function and the distribution of shocks across workers. By introducing less churning 
when markets are sclerotic, a targeted reduction of firing costs for low-skilled workers yields 
higher welfare gains than a commensurate reduction for firing costs for all workers. A 
                                                                          
6. There is also a positive externality on the supply of unskilled vacancies since more workers are looking for those jobs. 
However, it can be shown that the negative externality dominates. 
7. There are other papers using search equilibrium models with worker and/or job heterogeneity to analyze the effects of 
some policy measures. For instance, Acemoglu (2001) shows that unemployment benefits and minimum wages increase 
welfare in a model with heterogeneous jobs in segmented markets. Albrecht and Vroman (2002) analyze a labour market 
in which low and high-educated workers can be hired for unskilled jobs while only high-educated workers can perform 
skilled jobs, without allowing for on-the-job-search as in Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno (2003).  
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targeted reduction of firing costs for low-skilled workers achieves the greatest welfare gains 
when: i) the initial labor market tightness is low so that firms fill rapidly the newly created 
vacancies induced by the reduction in labor costs, ii) the elasticity of the matching rate 
of workers with respect to tightness is high (i.e., the matching function is not too concave) 
so that the process by which unemployed workers match with the new vacancies is fast, 
and iii) when the volatility of the shocks affecting low-skilled workers is higher since lower 
firing costs imply larger savings for firms which would have to pay firing costs more frequently 
given the higher volatility of jobs. 
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 motivates the analysis 
by describing some recent labor market reforms in several countries which share the 
common feature of using different EPL regulations for workers with different skills. As will be 
illustrated, in many countries, not just in Western European, notice periods, procedures for 
dismissals and severance payments vary across workers’ occupations. Moreover, recent 
reforms typically amount to targeted reductions of firing costs through the introduction 
of "atypical contracts", etc., albeit only for workers with worse employment prospects. Next, 
in order to search for some empirical evidence, Section 3 summarizes the empirical 
findings about the effects of dual EPL, both considering cross-country evidence and 
case studies pertaining to specific country experiences. Section 4 contains the theoretical 
analysis of the effects of firing costs in labor markets with heterogeneous workers competing 
for identical jobs. In Section 5 we present numerical simulations of the model and discuss 
their robustness to changes in some of the key parameters. Lastly, Section 6 concludes. 
Appendix A presents some comparative-statics results of the model, whereas Appendix B 
offers the derivation of the ergodic distribution of productivity which underlies the welfare 
analysis. 
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2 How EPL differs among workers 
It is well-known that EPL varies significantly across countries. However, less attention has 
been devoted to the fact that EPL also varies within countries depending on firms’ and 
worker’s characteristics such as firm size, existence of collective agreement, tenure, skill, 
educational level, etc.8 As regards worker’s skills, there are two sources of variation in the 
enforcement of EPL. First, procedural requirements for dismissals, notice and severance pay 
provisions, and prevailing standards of penalties for unfair dismissals are usually stricter 
for white-collar workers. Secondly, high-skill workers are not always entitled to be hired 
under "atypical" employment contracts involving less strict EPL provisions. 
Examples of countries with EPL provisions that are less strict for blue-collar workers 
are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece and Italy. With the exception of France, the 
required notice period in the other five countries is shorter for blue-collar workers than for 
white-collar workers. Typically, severance pay for individual dismissals is similar for both 
blue-collar and white-collar workers, except in Denmark and Greece, where the former are 
entitled to lower indemnities. Compensation pay for unjustified dismissal is also lower for 
blue-collar workers in Belgium and Greece.9 
With regard to partial reforms based on the introduction of "atypical" employment 
contracts, Spain provides a paradigmatic case study. After the surge of the proportion of 
temporary employees in total (salaried) employment (35% in 1995) following the 1984 
reform, there have been a series of countervailing labor market reforms during the 1990s 
(1994, 1997 and 2001) aimed at reducing that share by providing a less stringent EPL for 
permanent contracts and considerable restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts.10 
From the viewpoint of this paper, probably the most important reform was 
the one taking place in 1997 when an agreement to reform the system of labor 
contracts was reached. The agreement called for the creation of new permanent contracts 
in case of "unfair dismissals" entailing a mandatory firing cost which was lower than 
that pertaining to the old permanent contracts (33 days of wages per year of seniority 
with a maximum of 24 months-wages against 45 days of wages and 42 months-wages, 
respectively). However, the eligible groups were limited to young workers (aged 18-29), 
long-term unemployed registered at the public employment office for at least twelve months, 
unemployed above 45 years of age, disabled people and workers whose contract were 
transformed from temporary into permanent ones. By contrast, prime-aged workers in the 
age bracket 30-45 with unemployment spells shorter than a year were excluded.11 
In the 2001 reform, in an attempt to extend the use of the new contacts, the government 
managed to add young workers between 16 and 30 years of age, long-term unemployed 
registered for at least six months, and unemployed women of any age working in sectors 
where they were under-represented. 
                                                                          
8. OECD (1994) presents a detailed and comprehensive description of EPL in several countries and its variation by 
worker skills, tenure, the existence of collective agreements, and firm size. For a justification and the implications of 
variable enforcement of EPL by firm size, see Boeri and Jimeno (2005). 
9. More institutional details of EPL in these countries are in OECD (1994), Annex 2.A. The information in the text refers to 
the end of the 1990s. 
10. See Dolado, García-Serrano and Jimeno (2002) for a detailed description of those reforms. 
11. The reason for this restricted eligibility criterion was that it is against the Spanish constitutional rights to have to 
identical workers holding an, otherwise, identical open-ended contract except for their severance payments. Thus, the 
government in accord with the parties in the agreement, made the new contracts only available for specific targeted 
groups for which it was legal to provide those contracts. 
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Yet, Spain is not the only country that has liberalized atypical employment 
contracts or reduced firing costs contingent on some workers’ characteristics. In 1984 Italy 
also introduced "employment promotion contracts" (Contratti di Formazione e Lavoro) aimed 
at the hiring and firm-based training of young workers (between 15 and 29 years of age). 
Moreover, fixed-term contracts were first introduced in France in 1979 but their scope 
was very much reduced by the socialist government in 1982. After a reform in 1990, these 
contracts can only be used for seasonal activities, the replacement of an employee on leave, 
temporary increases in activity and for facilitating employment for targeted groups, ranging 
from the young to the long-term unemployed workers [see Blanchard and Landier (2002)]. 
In Latin America as well there have been dual labor market reforms, some aimed at 
decreasing firing costs (Colombia and Peru at the end of the 1980s) and others at increasing 
them (Brazil, Venezuela, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama).12 However, 
the only country which significantly liberalized the use of atypical contracts targeted on some 
demographic groups was Argentina, where a reform in 1991 introduced fixed-term contracts 
and training contracts for young workers, while a new reform in 1995 introduced special 
contracts to promote employment of certain population groups. 
 
                                                                          
12. See IDB (2003), chapter 7. 
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3 Empirical evidence on the effects to targeted EPL 
Broadly speaking, there are two streams in the empirical literature on the labor market effects 
of institutions. First, there are cross-country studies that use some quantitative or qualitative 
indicators representing those institutions to explain international differences in labor market 
outcomes, such as employment and unemployment rates.13 Within this literature, a large 
number of recent studies have looked at the interactions between institutions and shocks and 
to the different impact of institutions on the labor market outcomes of different population 
groups, such as youths and females.14 Nonetheless, in most studies, targeted employment 
policies or partial labor market reforms are considered, if anything, in the construction of the 
overall institutional indexes regarding EPL strength, but not separately as an institutional 
feature on its own. This approach can be fairly restrictive since, as will be discussed below, a 
general reduction of firing costs has not the same labor market effects as a commensurate 
reduction in the firing costs of a certain group of workers. 
Among the studies that estimate the labor market impact of targeted employment 
policies (e.g., those based on temporary contracts) separately from aggregate indexes 
of EPL, Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002) find that a less strict regulation of fixed-term 
employment contracts tends to reduce youth unemployment rates without any impact on the 
prime-age male unemployment rate. Likewise, using an unbalanced panel of nine OECD 
countries during the late 1980s and first half of the 1990s, Nunziata and Staffolani (2001) 
also try to estimate the effects of EPL by distinguishing three types of regulations: EPL 
regarding dismissals of permanent employees, regulations regarding fixed-term employees, 
and temporary work agencies (TWAs) regulations. They find that less stringent fixed-term 
contract regulations had a significant positive impact on temporary and total employment 
particularly when the economy is recovering from a recession. In the case of young workers 
(15-24 years of age), however, they find an increase of both temporary and permanent 
employment. Lastly, as regards the use TWAs, they find again that less stringent regulations 
tend to have an incremental effect on both temporary and total employment in downturns. 
Yet, in the case of young workers, the favorable effects on permanent employments are 
negligible. 
The second stream of the empirical literature looks at specific country episodes in 
order to measure the effect of reforms by analyzing labor market outcomes before and after 
the reform, along the lines of the "differences-in-differences" evaluation approach. Studies 
of this kind are, for instance, Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2003) on the Spanish 1997 reform, 
Blanchard and Landier (2002) on France, and Hopenhayn (2001) on the Argentinian reform. In 
the Spanish case, Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2003) find that the reduction of firing costs 
(and payroll taxes) for young, older and long-term unemployed workers had a positive effect 
on hiring for young workers, with little effect on dismissals, while it increased both dismissals 
and hiring for older men. Blanchard and Landier (2002), looking at transitions between 
temporary and permanent employment, observe increased turnover since 1983 in France, 
specially at younger cohorts, for whom the probability of holding a fixed-term job has 
increased a lot while their probabilities of staying or becoming unemployed show no clear 
trend. Finally, Hopenhayn (2001) also finds that the introduction of fixed-term contracts in 
                                                                          
13. See Nickell and Layard (1999).  
14. On interactions, see Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). On the different impact of labor market institutions across 
population groups, see Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2003), Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002), and Neumark 
and Wascher (2003). On the impact of employment protection legislation on employment adjustment, see Caballero, 
Engel and Micco (2003). 
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Argentina has had a very strong impact on labor turnover, inducing an increase in hiring but 
also some strong substitution of permanent jobs by temporary jobs. 
In sum, the available empirical evidence points out that the effects of targeted EPL 
reforms seemingly depend on the phase of the business cycle when they are implemented 
and that there exist spillover effects of either sign on those groups not directly affected by the 
regulations. In the sequel, we develop a simple analytical framework where to understand 
these phenomena. 
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4 A model of firing costs with heterogeneous workets 
Our model draws on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) with two extensions. First, we allow for 
heterogeneity in workers’ skills. And, secondly, we assume that the initial productivity of jobs 
is random. The first extension gets at how reforms aimed at easing firings of one type of 
workers affects unemployment, productivity and welfare of all workers, both those affected 
and those unaffected by the reform. The second extension allows for a more detailed analysis 
of how the hiring of different types of workers depends crucially on the structure of firing 
costs. Firing costs are modeled as pure waste (not as a transfer to the worker) and, hence, 
do not play any efficiency role.15 
As is conventional, the model is in continuous time and only steady states 
are considered. The economy is populated by a continuum of workers of measure one. 
Workers are risk neutral, infinitely lived, and are of two types depending on their productivity 
(low, L, and high, H). Firms know the worker’s type, the arrival rate of productivity shocks 
and the distributions from which productivity is drawn from each worker’s type. The mass 
of workers of type L is α. The income obtained while unemployed is  zi (i = L,H), which may 
differ for low skilled and high skilled workers. 
The number of firms is endogenously determined. Each firm offers one job. The cost 
of keeping a job vacancy unfilled is c. Vacancies are created until the exhaustion of any rents 
from vacancy creation. When a worker and a firm with a job vacancy meet, they realize the 
value of the match. The productivity of the match is a random draw from a c.d.f. Fi(ε) with 
support [0, 1], (i = L,H), such that FL(ε) > FH(ε) for all ε. Thus, the distribution of productivity of 
H-type workers stochastically dominates the distribution of productivity of L-type workers. 
Wages are determined by continuous Nash bargaining. 
Job termination is endogenous. There are i.i.d. productivity shocks with Poisson 
arrival rates λi (i = L,H). To terminate the job, firms must pay pure-waste dismissal costs 
Ki (i = L,H). Further, we assume that all separations involve dismissal costs. By allowing 
for different termination costs for different types of workers we aim at capturing the 
"targeted/dual" nature of EPL discussed at length in the previous sections. Our intuition is 
that there are direct and indirect effects of reducing the firing costs for L-type workers. 
First, the direct effect stems from the fact that the productivity threshold at which 
L-type workers are dismissed (hired) is higher (lower) the lower KL is. The indirect effects, 
in turn, arise through the determination of the value of jobs filled with by H-type workers which 
also changes when KL is reduced. 
Matching, hiring, and firing 
Job vacancies and unemployed workers meet according to a conventional CRS matching 
function ( , )m v u , where v and u denote, respectively, the masses of job vacancies and of 
unemployed workers. The matching function is increasing in both arguments and 
homogeneous of degree one. Labor market tightness is denoted by θ = v//u. Given the 
matching function, firms meet with L-type unemployed workers with probability δq(θ )  and 
with H-type unemployed workers with probability (1-δ)q(θ ) , where δ is the proportion of 
unemployed workers of type L and q(θ )  = m(1,1/θ )  being q’(θ ) < 0. The matching rate of 
workers is θq(θ ) . 
                                                                          
15. More plausibly, there could be some efficiency and insurance roles that could justify an optimal level of firing costs 
different from zero. As discussed in the Introduction, we abstract from those to keep the analysis manageable. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0510 
After meeting a worker and knowing the match-specific productivity, employers face 
a hiring decision. Since the surplus of the match is increasing in productivity, there are two 
productivity thresholds ( ,  h hL Hε ε ) above which hiring takes place. As for the firing decision, 
after the match is hit by a productivity shock, employers decide whether or not to terminate 
the job. For each worker’s type there are again two productivity thresholds ( ,d dL Hε ε ) below 
which jobs are terminated. 
Flows 
Given the matching probabilities and the hiring and firing rules, the flow equations are given 
by: 
[(1 ( )] ( ) ( )L h L dL L L LF q u F e− =ε θ θ δ λ ε , (1) 
[1 ( )] ( )(1 ) ( )H h H dH H H HF q u F e− − =ε θ θ δ λ ε , (2) 
where  eL and  eH are the masses of  L and  H-type employed workers, respectively. The 
left-hand-sides of (1) and (2) give the outflows from unemployment while the right-hand-sides 
give the inflows to unemployment (i.e., outflows from employment) for  L and H-type workers, 
respectively. 
Since δu+eL = α and (1-δ)u+eH = 1-α, the steady state unemployment rates of both 
types of workers are: 
( )
[(1 ( )] ( ) ( )
L d
L L





α ε θ θ λ ε= = − + , (1’) 
 
( )(1 )
1 [1 ( )] ( ) ( )
H d
H H




−= =− − +
λ εδ
α ε θ θ λ ε  (2’) 
Bellman equations  
Let  Ui and  Wi(ε) denote, respectively, the value of unemployment and the value of 
employment with productivity  ε, for workers of type i (= L,H). Then, the corresponding 
Bellman equations are given by: 
1




i i i irU z q W x U dF x= + −∫
ε
θ θ  (3) 
 
1




i i i i i i i i irW w F U W W x W dF x= + − + −∫
ε
ε ε λ ε ε λ ε  (4) 
where  r is the interest rate,  z  is the flow utility while unemployed (interpreted here as home 
production or leisure and, thus, not to be financed), and w is the wage. Notice that, since 
there is continuous renegotiation, wages depend on productivity and change instantly every 
time a productivity shock occurs. 
As regards the employers, the value functions of an unfilled vacancy (V) and the 
value functions of filled vacancies with worker of type i (Ji) are given by the following 
Bellman equations: 
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1 1




L HrV c q J x V dF x q J x V dF x= − + − + − −∫ ∫
ε ε
δ θ δ θ  (5) 
1




i i i i i i i i irJ w F V J K J x J dF x= − + − − + −∫
ε
ε ε ε λ ε ε λ ε  (6) 
Wage determination 
When a match is formed, wages are determined by symmetric Nash bargaining with 
continuous renegotiation, where the bargaining power for each party is equal to 0.5. This 
implies: 
( ) ( )i i i iJ V K W U− + = −ε ε  (7) 
Hence, in our setup, workers get insider power for firing costs since the 
beginning of the match to extract the rents from firing costs. In other words, the possibility 
of undoing the detrimental effect of firing costs on firm’s profits by the worker accepting a 
wage cut at the beginning of the match is excluded. As shown by Ljungqvist (2002), this 
assumption is crucial for the analysis of the employment effects of firing costs. When 
firing costs are assumed to reduce the firm’s threat point in the initial match, as in 
equation (7), they have a significantly impact on hiring and tend to increase equilibrium 
unemployment while, by contrast, they tend to increase employment when the worker’s 
relative share of match surplus is assumed to remain invariant as the severance pay varies.16 
Under our assumption of continuous bargaining, the wage determination condition in 
equation (7) determines both the relative split of the match surplus when firms bargain 
with not yet hired workers, and in bargains with hired workers in consecutive renegotiations. 
Thus, the effects of firing costs on wages are internalized upon the initial match. 
Equilibrium 
The productivity thresholds at which the hiring process starts to take place are those at which 
the value of a filled vacancy is equal to the value of an unfilled vacancy. Since there is free 
entry, V = 0 in the steady-state equilibrium. Likewise, jobs are terminated when the value of 
the job is equal to the value of an unfilled vacancy minus termination costs. Thus, 
( ) 0hi iJ V= =ε  (8) 
( ) 0di i iJ K V+ = =ε  (8’) 
Solving the model 
The surplus of a job of productivity  ε occupied by a worker of type  i is  
( ) ( ) ( )i i i i iS J V K W U= − + + −ε ε ε  
Equations (4) and (6) can be rewritten as follows: 
                                                                          
16. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) propose alternative specifications of the bargaining process in which the worker 
extract rents from firing costs in continuing matches but not in the first match. Ljungqvist (2002) shows that this kind of a 
two-tier wage system is formally equivalent to assuming that the relative split of the match surplus is unaffected by 
firing costs throughout the employment relationship. This equivalence arises by imposing a wage profile under the 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) set up under which new workers post a bond equal to their share of any future 
expected firing costs. A version of the model where the outside option of the firm for newly created jobs is simply V,and 
not V+K, has also been calibrated with qualitatively similar results and is available upon request. 
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 (6’) 
Hence, adding up those two equations and using (7) yields: 




i i i i i i i
qr S z S x dF x S x dF x r V K+ = − + − − −∫ ∫
ε ε
θ θλ ε ε λ                   (9) 





= +ε λ and integrating by parts implies that: 
1 11( ) ( ) [1 ( )] ( ) [1 ( )]          for all i i ii i
i
S x dF x F S F x dx
r
= − + −+∫ ∫ε εε ε ελ  
Thus, 
1 1( )( ) ( ) [1 ( )] [1 ( )]
2( )









qr S z F x dx F x dx
r r
q F S r V K
+ = − + − − − −+ +
− − − −
∫ ∫
ε ε
λ θ θλ ε ε λ λ
θ θ ε ε
 (10) 
This equation gives the productivity thresholds values for hiring and firing. 
Since ( ) 0 and ( ) 2d hi i i i iS S K= =ε ε , and in equilibrium the value of an unfilled vacancy is nil, 
then: 
1 1( )[1 ( )] [1 ( )] ( )[1 ( )]
2( )d h
i i
d i i i hi
i i i i
i i
qz F x dx F x dx q F r K
r r
⎡ ⎤= − − + − + − −⎣ ⎦+ +∫ ∫ε ε
λ θ θε θ θ ελ λ    (11) 
1 1( )[1 ( )] [1 ( )] ( )[1 ( )] 2
2( )d h
i i
h i i i hi
i i i i i
i i
qz F x dx F x dx q F r K
r r
⎡ ⎤= − − + − + − + +⎣ ⎦+ +∫ ∫ε ε
λ θ θε θ θ ε λλ λ  (12) 
so that 2( )h di i i ir K− = +ε ε λ . Equations (11) and (12) give the job creation and job 
destruction rules. Notice that all of them depend on labor market tightness. Thus, the rules for 
hiring and firing each type of worker depend on labor market tightness, which, in hand, is 
determined by the job flows implied by those hiring and firing rules. 
Finally, in equilibrium the supply of vacancies is determined by the free-entry 
condition, V = 0, which can be written as follows: 
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A graphic illustration 
The set of equations above can be grouped in three blocks.17 The two pairs of equations 
in (11) and (12) give the relationships between the hiring and firing thresholds, on the one 
hand, and labor market tightness, on the other. As tightness rises, workers have a higher 
reservation value and, hence, the firing productivity thresholds increase (see equation A.1 in 
Appendix A). Further, insofar as job destruction is higher, the firms initially hire worker at 
higher levels of productivity, so that the hiring threshold also increases with tightness. The 
increasing relationships between the firing thresholds and tightness are represented, 
respectively, by the upwards sloping loci JD in Panels I (low skilled workers) and II (high skilled 
workers) of Figure 1. Also, the increasing relationships between the hiring thresholds and 
tightness are represented, respectively, by the upwards sloping loci JH in Panels III (low 
skilled workers) and IV (high skilled workers) of the same Figure. 
The effects of firing costs on the hiring and firing thresholds are standard. For given 
tightness, the higher firing costs are, the lower is the firing threshold, and the higher is the 
hiring threshold (see equations A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A). Hence, when firing costs are 
reduced there is more job destruction and more hiring, as is conventionally found in the 
literature. This means that, in Figure 1, the loci JD shifts to the left and the loci JH shifts to the 
right as firing costs fall. 
The second block of the model is the job creation condition given by equation (13). 
This condition captures the relationships between tightness, the hiring thresholds and the 
skill composition of the unemployment pool. First, as the firing threshold rises the expected 
duration of the match is shorter and, hence, the expected surplus from filled vacancies falls. 
Thus, vacancy creation is lower and tightness decreases (see equation A.4 in Appendix A). 
This relationship is plotted as the downwards-sloping loci JC in Panels I to IV of Figure 1. 
Secondly, as the proportion of low skill unemployed changes, tightness also changes in a 
way that depends on the difference between the expected surplus from hiring low-skilled 
workers and the expected surplus from hiring high-skilled workers. Plausibly, the expected 
surplus from jobs filled by high-skilled workers is larger and tightness decreases with the 
proportion of low-skilled unemployed (see equation A.6 in Appendix A). As for the effects of 
firing costs, there two effects on job creation. First, there is the direct effect [last two terms in 
equation (13)] of making the expected surplus of the match lower and, therefore, induce 
firms to open fewer vacancies. Secondly, by making firing and hiring less frequent, they also 
decrease the expected gains from vacancy creation and reduce tightness. This means 
that the locus JC shifts upwards as firing costs are reduced (see equations A.7 and A.8 in 
Appendix A). 
Finally, equations (1’) and (2’) show how tightness and thresholds determine the size 
and the composition of the unemployment pool, giving the so-called Beveridge curve, 
which we plot as the downwards-sloping locus BC in Panel V of Figure 1. The number 
of unemployed workers of each group rises with the corresponding job destruction 
                                                                          
17. Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) assume that all jobs start at the same productivity level, so that in their model there 
is no hiring rule. 
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threshold. Thus, unemployment is decreasing in labor market tightness, as workers 
receive job offers more often when the labor market is tighter. This locus shifts to the right 
as the destruction thresholds rises following a reduction of firing costs. Panels VI and VII 
of Figure 1 represent the determination of the skill composition of unemployment by yielding 
the number of L and H-type unemployed, respectively, given the lines from the origin with 
slopes δ and 1- δ. 
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Figure 2, in turn, depicts the effects of lowering firing costs for the L-type workers 
(KL is decreased) while Figure 3 represents the effects of a comprehensive reduction of firing 
costs (both KL and KH fall). A reduction in the firing costs of L-type workers shifts the job 
creation loci (13) upwards in Panels I, II, III and IV. As for the hiring and firing rules, the locus 
representing the firing decision of L-type workers, (JD) in Panel I, shifts to the left, while the 
locus representing the hiring decision of low skill workers, (JC) in Panel III, shifts to the right. 
Notice that the loci representing the firing and hiring decisions of H-type workers remain 
invariant as we are only considering a reduction of firing costs for the L-type workers. In the 
new equilibrium, tightness increases, the job destruction thresholds are higher for both types 
of workers, the hiring threshold for H-type worker also rises, whereas the effect on the hiring 
threshold for L-type workers has an ambiguous sign. Panels V, VI and VII complete the 
representation of the new equilibrium, plotting the corresponding unemployment rate and the 
proportion of L-type workers. In Panel V, the BC locus shifts upwards as job destruction 
thresholds increase. The change in the proportion of L-type unemployed has an ambiguous 
sign. In Figure 2, only for illustrative purposes, we assume that this proportion falls, so that in 
Panel VI the slope of the line from the origin falls, while the corresponding line for H-type 
workers in Panel VII becomes steeper. As can be observed, total unemployment may either 
rise or fall depending on the relative size of the shift of the BC curve and of the rise in 
tightness. Assuming that both aggregate unemployment and the proportion of low 
skilled unemployed fall, the unemployment rate of the L-type workers decreases while the 
unemployment rate of high skilled workers may rise (as in Figure 2) or fall depending on 
the relative size of the changes in total unemployment and in the composition of the pool of 
unemployed. 
Figure 3 represents the effects of a comprehensive reduction in firing costs 
(both KL and KH are decreased). As in the previous case, the job creation locus (13) 
shifts upwards, while the loci representing the firing rules (JD) shift to the left, and those 
representing the hiring rules (JH) shift to the right for both types of workers. Thus, as in the 
case of a targeted reduction, both tightness and job destruction increase, but now the 
effect of the overall reduction of firing costs on the hiring thresholds of all workers has 
an ambiguous sign. Notice also that, as before, the skill composition of unemployment 
may change either way. Assuming again that both total unemployment and the proportion 
of L-type unemployed fall, the unemployment rate of low skilled workers also falls, while 
the sign of the change in the unemployment rate of high skilled workers is ambiguous. 
We now turn to some numerical simulations of the model in order to grasp further 
insights on the magnitude of the effects at work. 
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5 Numerical examples 
To solve the model we must find a vector of variables (δ,u,θ,εLh ,εLd, εHh, εHd) satisfying 
equations (1’), (2’), (11), (12) and (13). Note that equations (11) and (12) come in pairs, so that 
we have seven equations in seven unknowns. The solution to this system cannot be found 
analytically, and so one has to resort to numerical simulations in order to grasp some 
understanding of the effects of reductions of firing costs. To perform simulations, we assume 
that the productivity of L-type workers, εL, is uniformly distributed in [0,1] and that the 
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Throughout the set of simulations presented below we choose parameter values 
following previous calibration exercises in the literature [e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) 
and Ljungqvist (2002)], with some variations to perform some robustness analysis and 
                                                                          
18. This assumption simplifies the computation but can be restrictive. In effect, by assuming uniform distributions for 
productivity we minimize the employment changes after variations in the hiring and destruction thresholds which would 
be significantly higher with more skewed distributions. 
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comparisons across labor markets with different structural conditions. Since targeted 
employment policies with dual EPL are most often observed in "sclerotic" labor markets, we 
start by performing a numerical example of the effects of reducing firing costs in a market 
characterized by high unemployment, and low tightness and job turnover. Then, we 
will choose alternative parameter values to calibrate a "tight" labor market, with low 
unemployment, and high tightness and job turnover. In a following subsection we discuss 
robustness of the results. 
The model period is one quarter. Following Ljungqvist (2002) and Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1994), we set the quarterly interest rate r = 0.01. As for the matching function, we 
take 
where h > 0 is a shift parameter and γ is a parameter capturing the decreasing returns in the 
elasticity of the job finding-rate w.r.t. tightness so that for higher values of γ concavity 
increases.19 Initially, we choose h = 0.5 and γ = 1, which implies a strong concavity (SC) of the 
matching function. In our baseline simulations of a model with homogeneous workers, 
this matching function delivers quarterly exit rates of unemployment ranging from 14.5% 
to 26.1%, which imply that the expected average duration of an unemployment spell is 
between 11 and 21 months, values in line with those observed in the real world. 
The rest of the parameter values are also chosen following previous calibration 
exercises in the literature and trying to match some of the characteristics of a sclerotic labor 
market. The flow cost of posting a vacancy is set at c = 1/3, namely about 2/3 of average 
worker’s productivity. The flow utility for being unemployed is set at zL = zH = 0.25, namely 
half of worker’s average productivity. The arrival rates of productivity shocks, λL and λH, 
are initially set at λL = λH = 0.081, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), which, for 
homogeneous workers with a uniform distribution of productivity in [0,1], yields quarterly firing 
rates ranging from 3.2% (for high firing costs) to 4% (nil firing costs). The proportion of high 
skilled workers and their minimum value of the productivity are set at α = 1/2 and εHmin = 1/3, 
which for the highest value of firing costs yields that the proportion of low skilled unemployed 
is 74.9%. 
We compute the stationary equilibria corresponding to alternative values of 
firing costs ranging form 0 to a highest value of KL = KH = 1, which is roughly of the same 
order of magnitude as six month of an average worker’s production. We look at the 
effects of changing the firing costs for L-type workers (KL) in the range [0, 1] on: i) labor 
market tightness (θ), ii) unemployment rates, iii) productivity thresholds levels for hiring 
and firing, iv) asset values for each type of worker and employment status, and v) average 
productivity and total production (net of vacancy costs). Asset values, average productivity 
and production are computed using the ergodic distribution of employment, which is derived 
in Appendix B. We compare these results to the effects of a reform reducing firing costs for 
high-skilled workers (that is, changing the firing costs for H-type workers (KH) in the 
range [0, 1]), and to the effects of a comprehensive reform (namely, a similar reduction of both 
KL and KH). 
                                                                          
19. This functional form has been proposed by Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000). Note that when γ↑0, it 
becomes the Cobb-Douglas matching function, m(u, v)=h u0.5 v0.5. Furthermore, the elasticity of the matching rate of 
workers, θq(θ), with respect to θ for this functional form is (1+ θ γ)-1. Thus, the higher is γ, the lower will be that elasticity. 
In the Cobb-Douglas case, the elasticity is ½ and, thus, constant. 
( )1( , ) 0.5 0.5
huvm u v
u vγ γ γ
=
+
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Simulation I: A sclerotic labor market 
Given a labor market characterized for the set of parameter values discussed above, 
Figures 4a, 4b and 4c present, respectively, the steady state values of the main variables 
under i) a targeted reduction of firing costs of low skilled workers, ii) a targeted reduction of 
firing costs of high skilled workers, and iii) a comprehensive reform of firing costs for all 
workers. Table 1 gathers the results for three extreme cases (KL = KH = 1, KL = 0 and KH = 1, 
and KL = 1 and KH = 0). We now comment on the main salient features of these results and 
discuss the economic forces at work. 
In this sclerotic labor market, there is initially a very low value of labor market 
tightness (θ is around 0.54) and high unemployment rates of L-type (17.9%) and H-type 
workers (6.0%). This means that initially only 24.1% of the unemployed are high-skilled. As 
observed in panel 1 of Figure 4a, a reduction of KL from 1 (the benchmark value) to 0 
increases tightness, giving rise to a large reduction of the unemployment rate of L-type 
workers of about 4.2 percentage points, while the unemployment rate of H-type workers 
increases by about 2.1 percentage points (panel 2).20 Also, as KL falls and the labor market 
becomes tighter and both the hiring and the firing rates of L-type workers increase. By 
contrast, as discussed before, we observe a parallel increase in the hiring and firing 
thresholds for H-type workers (as KH remains unchanged), giving rise to an increase in their 
unemployment rate (panels 2 and 4). Notice also that as KL falls, average productivity rises, 
since the less productive matches are destroyed, and therefore total production increases. 
Welfare of both types of workers increases, regardless of their employment status (panel 5), 
the reason being that their wages (conditional on having a job) are higher, because of the 
higher value of being unemployed [higher θq(θ)], and the higher average productivity of 
employed workers (panel 6). 
Next, Figure 4b plots the effects of a similar reform, this time targeted at reducing 
only the firing costs of H-type workers, instead of L-type workers. Although the results are 
qualitatively similar to those discussed before, the quantitative effects are significantly 
different, as i) the increase in tightness is smaller, ii) the fall in unemployment rate of L-type 
workers and the rise in the unemployment rate of H-type workers are almost negligible, 
and iii) the welfare gains are significantly lower than under a targeted reduction of firing costs 
of low skilled workers. 
Finally, the effects of the two above-mentioned targeted reforms are also 
quantitatively different to those of a comprehensive reform resulting in a simultaneous 
reduction of the firing costs for all workers by the same amount. Since both types of workers 
have the same weight in total population, we compare the above-mentioned targeted 
reforms where firing costs go from 1 to 0 for each group to a comprehensive reform 
where severance payments go down from 1 to 0.5 for all workers. Figure 4c plot the steady 
state values of the main labor market variables, while Table 1 provides a summary of the 
comparison with the two previous targeted reductions of firing costs commented above. The 
main conclusions to be drawn are the following. Labor market tightness is highest and the 
unemployment rate of low skilled workers is lowest under a targeted reduction of firing costs 
for L-type workers. Total production and average productivity are highest under a targeted 
reduction of firing costs for H-type workers, since in this case the hiring threshold for this type 
of workers is lowest and the destruction rate is highest. All workers, regardless of their skills 
and employment status, are better off under a targeted reduction of firing costs for L-type 
workers. Thus, this type of EPL policy achieves the largest welfare gains in sclerotic labor 
                                                                          
20. Note that, in order to follow the correct direction of changes as KL decreases, the Figures should be looked from 
right to left since the horizontal axis of the panels display increasing values of KL  
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markets. It unambiguously reduces the unemployment rate of L-type workers while that of 
H-type workers does not increase by much or, as will be discussed below, may even 
decrease if one allows for a faster response of the job-finding rate as the labor market gets 
tighter. In this last case, any increase in expected profits stemming from lower firing costs for 
less productive workers will therefore translate into both a strong increase in job creation and 
in the number of matches, which may end up cutting not only the unemployment of those 
L-type workers directly affected by the reform but also the unemployment rate of the H-type 
workers. Hence, this targeted reform turns out to be the more welfare-enhancing for all 
workers in the sense that the asset values of being employed or unemployed raise by a larger 
amount (because the higher unemployment, if any, of H-type workers is more than 
compensated by their higher wages whilst both wages and employment of L-type workers 
raise) and total production (net of costs of opening vacancies) also achieves the largest 
increase.21 
                                                                          
21. As mentioned in note 13, we are not considering other efficiency and insurance reasons which may yield a 
decreasing welfare effect of reducing firing costs. 
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Figure 4a. Reducing firing costs of low-skilled workers in a sclerotic labor 
market 
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Figure 4b. Reducing firing costs of high-skilled workers in a sclerotic labor market 
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Notes: Steady state values for simulations with the following set of parameter values: r = 0.01, 
h = 0.5, γ = 1, c = 1/3, α = 1/2, εHmin = 1/3, zL = zH = 0.25, λL = λH = 0.081.  
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Simulation II: A tight labor market 
The previous results provide some relevant insights on the effects of EPL reforms in labor 
markets with heterogeneous workers. First, the turnover rates of all workers are affected by 
any reform, regardless of the group at which the reduction of firing costs is targeted. 
Secondly, there are several effects of the EPL reforms which may have opposite welfare 
implications. In principle, lower firing costs imply more job destruction but also higher labor 
market tightness and a higher outflow rate of unemployment. Moreover, a tighter labor market 
implies higher wages for employed workers. Third, lower firing costs increase the value of a 
filled job and the value of an unfilled vacancy and, hence, job creation rises. Under the 
assumptions of the previous simulation, it turns out that the sum of all these effects is a 
welfare-enhancing result, particularly when the reduction of firing costs affects only the L-type 
workers. This is so because in a sclerotic labor market the job creation effect dominates the 
negative effects of higher job destruction on workers’ welfare. 
To gain further insights on this intuition, we now report the simulation results of the 
three types of EPL reform considered above in a labor market in which tightness is initially 
high. Thus we change some parameter values to simulate a labor market in which initially the 
unemployment rate is about half of the average unemployment rate in Simulation I above. We 
increase the scale matching parameter to h = 2 and reduce the unemployment flow incomes 
to zL = zH = 0.1, the flow cost of posting a vacancy to c = 0.1 and the arrival rates of 
productivity shocks to λL = λH = 0.04.22 Figures 5a and 5b present, respectively, the effects of 
reducing the firing costs of L-type and H-type workers, while Figure 5c present a similar set of 
results regarding a simultaneous reduction of firing costs for both types of workers. Table 2 
gives the comparison of three reductions of firing costs of the same order of magnitude. 
In this tight labor market, initially (i.e., when KL = KH = 1) the vacancy-unemployment 
ratio is 2.72, the unemployment rates are 6.9% and 5.5% for L-type and H-type workers, 
respectively, so that the proportion of H-type unemployed is 55.8%. Both targeted reforms, 
increase tightness, and as in the case of a sclerotic labor market, this rise in tightness is larger 
when the targeted reduction affects L-type workers. After targeted reductions of firing costs, 
only the unemployment rate of the affected group falls, while the impact on the 
unemployment rate of the other groups is negligible. In contrast with the previous simulation 
of a sclerotic labor market, where all workers, regardless of their skills and employment 
status, get the largest welfare gains under a targeted reduction of firing costs of the low 
skilled, in this simulation of a tight labor market, employed workers, regardless of their skills, 
are better off after a comprehensive reform or after a targeted reduction of firing costs of high 
skilled workers, while unemployed workers are better off after a comprehensive reform or 
after a targeted reduction of firing costs of low skilled workers. Hence, the impact of 
unemployment and the support for alternative reductions of firing costs seem to change 
depending on the type of labor market being considered. 
 
 
                                                                          
22. Notice that asset values and welfare cannot be compared across simulations, as we are imposing different utility 
values of unemployment in each case. 
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Figure 5c. A comprehensive reduction of firing costs in a tight labor market 
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Notes: Steady state values for simulations with the following set of parameter values: r = 0.01, 
h = 2, γ = 1, c = 0.1, α = 1/2, εHmin = 1/3, zL = zH = 0.1, λL = λH = 0.04.  
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Further discussion: Alternative assumptions  
The results from the simulations above obviously depend on some of the assumptions made. 
Among them, the specification of the matching function, the assumption of the same rate of 
arrival of productivity shocks to all workers, and the steady-state condition which equals 
inflows and outflows of unemployment for each type of workers have some implications 
which we now discuss. 
As discussed above, the effects of EPL on job creation depend crucially on the 
elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies. In the previous simulations we 
have used a matching function featuring strong concavity, namely, where the number of 
consummated matches responds slowly to increasing vacancy-unemployment ratio. Had we 
used a Cobb-Douglas matching function, with γ↑0 instead of γ = 1, decreasing returns in the 
job-finding rate would not arise so quickly (see footnote 21). Hence, job creation could 
become so strong (relative to the strongly-concave case) that also ends up favoring the 
employment outcomes of those workers not directly affected by the partial reform. Thus, in 
this case, the reduction of unemployment rates and the rise of the exit rates from 
unemployment and welfare gains are higher after any reduction of firing costs. 
This matching elasticity is also crucial to understand the different qualitative results 
from reforms in a sclerotic labor market and in a tight labor market. The incentives to open 
new vacancies depend on the skill composition of the unemployment pool and the matching 
rate with the unemployed. In a sclerotic labor market, the proportion of L-type unemployed 
workers is typically large and the probability of filling the vacancy is high. On the contrary, in 
our characterization of the tight labor market, the proportion of H-type workers is higher but 
the probability of filling a vacancy is lower. Hence, the response of job creation to reducing 
firing costs may be lower than in the sclerotic labor market. 
Differences in the volatilities of productivity across groups, captured by changes in 
the Poisson rate of arrival of the shocks (λH and λL), also affect the impact of reductions of 
firing costs. When, as it seems realistic, there is higher volatility in the productivity of matches 
with L-type workers than with, a reduction in KL leads to larger welfare gains for any reduction 
of firing costs, but, in particular, for targeted reductions on the low skilled.23 
Finally, it is important to remark that our results refer only to a comparison of 
steady-states for different values of the firing costs. By imposing that inflows and outflows of 
unemployment are equal for each type of worker, we are obtaining the corresponding 
equilibrium unemployment rates for different sets of parameter values. Thus, Figures 4 and 5 
should not be read as providing the dynamic effects of EPL reforms and our welfare analysis 
only concern comparison of asset values in steady state. Likewise, panels 5 of the Figures 
cannot provide any hint about the changes in the asset values of L and H-type employed and 
unemployed workers in the transition paths between steady states. 
 
                                                                          
23. The results of the simulations with different arrival rates of productivity shocks for low-skilled and high-skilled workers 
are available from the authors upon request. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
One relevant feature of employment policies and labor market reforms is that they are very 
often targeted at some demographic groups, particularly at those facing more difficulties in 
finding jobs (youth, female, long-term unemployed, etc). Some empirical studies trying to 
estimate the effects of this type of policies conclude that the impact on the labor market 
outcomes for different population groups can be very different, and do not always move in the 
same direction. 
In this paper we have presented a version of Mortensen and Pissarides’ (1994) 
search equilibrium model, with heterogeneous workers competing for the same jobs, which 
illustrates why it may be difficult to pin down the consequences of this type of reforms. 
According to some simulation results, the impact of targeted reductions of firing costs on 
unemployment and welfare of different groups of workers may depend on the initial state of 
the labor market (more or less tight), on the volatility of the productivity on continuing jobs, 
and on the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies. An interesting 
outcome of our analysis is that is that support for targeted reforms is likely (subject to our 
parameter choice) to be larger in sclerotic labor markets than in tight ones, in accord with the 
evidence presented by Saint-Paul (1996) about the timing of these reforms. 
Finally, although we have centered our analysis on the reduction of firing costs for 
different types of workers, it is plausible that the effects of other targeted employment policies 
(like targeted reductions of non-wage costs or differentiated minimum wages) are also 
contingent on the initial characteristics of the labor market being analyzed. Hence, our future 
research agenda will examine whether the proposed analytical framework could prove as well 
useful in examining the effects of those policies. 
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Appendix A: Some comparative statistics of the model  
a) The hiring and the firing rules 
Differentiating equation (11) using Leibniz’s rule, and making use of the result that 
2( )h di i i ir K− = +ε ε λ , yields : 
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b) The job creation condition 
Partial differentiation of equation (13) yields: 
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The effect of firing costs on tightness in the job creation condition has a negative 
sign, as indicated by: 
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c) The Beveridge curve 
Equations (1’) and (2’) give how tightness and thresholds determine the size and composition 
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Hence, the number of unemployed workers of each group rises with the 
corresponding job destruction threshold. It is decreasing in labor market tightness, as the 
arrival rate of job offer falls. Signing the effects of tightness and thresholds on the skill 
composition of the unemployed is more cumbersome as: 
(1 ) L H
L H L H
du dud
u u u u
− δ δδ = −+ +  (A.10) 
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Appendix B: The ergodic distribution of productivity 
To derive the ergodic distribution of productivity let us just consider one type of worker. Let 
G(x), dε  ≤  x  ≤ 1 be the ergodic distribution of productivity, x, where dε  is the level of 
productivity at which jobs are destroyed, and let F(x) be the distribution function from which 
productivity shocks are drawn. Workers are hired from the pool of unemployed when 
x ≥  hε , being dε  ≤ hε . 
Consider first the support of the distribution d hx≤ ≤ε ε . In any infinitesimally small 
time interval, dt, the mass of employed workers λdt receive a productivity shock, hence, the 
number of jobs with productivity x’  ≤  x, increases by the number of jobs with productivity 
above x downgrading their productivity between x and the destruction threshold εd: 
(1 )[1 ( )][ ( ) ( )] ,        for  d d hu G x F x F dt x− − − ≤ ≤ε λ ε ε  
The number of jobs of productivity x’ ≤ x, for, d hx≤ ≤ε ε , being destroyed in any 
infinitesimally small time interval, dt, is given by the number of jobs which upgrade their 
productivity above x and those being destroyed with productivity below the destruction 
threshold εd: 
d(1 ) ( )[1 [ ( ) ( )]] ,        for d hu G x F x F dt x− − − ≤ ≤ε λ ε ε  
Now, consider the rest of the support of the distribution, x > hε . In any infinitesimally 
small time interval, dt, the mass of employed workers λdt receive a productivity shock, while a 
mass of uθq(θ)dt are hired. Thus, the number of jobs with productivity x’ ≤ x, increases by 
additions from firms with productivity above x and firms form the lower segment of the 
distribution, d hx≤ ≤ε ε , changing their productivity between x and hε , and by the new 
hires: 
(1 )[1 ( ))][ ( ) ( )] ( )[ ( ) ( )] ,      for  d h hu G x F x F dt u q F x F dt x− − − + − >ε λ θ θ ε ε  
 On the other hand, the number of jobs of productivity x’≤x, for x > hε , being 
destroyed is given by the jobs which upgrade their productivity below x and the jobs which 
downgrade their productivity below the hiring threshold εh: 
(1 ) ( )[1 [ ( ) ( )]] ,        for d hu G x F x F dt x− − − >ε λ ε  
Thus, the ergodic distribution must satisfy 
[ ]
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where, to derive the second expression, we make use of the steady state condition for 
unemployment inflows and outflows which yields 
( ) ( )







λ ε  
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These two equations give, respectively 
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Notice that if there are no firing costs, so that dε   = hε , then 
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Finally, in our model with a mass α of low-skilled workers and a mass (1- α) of 
high-skilled workers, the ergodic distribution of productivity, conditioned on employment, is  
( ) ( ) [1 (1 ) ] ( )L Hu G x u G x− + − − −α δ α δ  
where Gi(x) (i = L,H) is the ergodic distribution related to Fi(x) as indicated above. Using this 
distribution we compute average productivity 
1 1




L Hu xdG x u xdG x
avprod
u




α δ α δ
 
and total production, net of vacancy costs, given by: 
(1 )u avprod uc− −θ  
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